The traditional English School scholarship has been preoccupied with the global expansion of international society of sovereign states. Recent critiques pointed out that the entrant's agency largely went unnoticed and made the case that the research should focus on their identities, memories and foreign policy behavior. This paper probes how medieval memories influenced 
Introduction
This article examines the influence of historical memories on the behavior of states entering the international society. In particular, I will investigate how Serbia's historical memories shaped its socialization with the European society of states since the early 19 th century. Serbia's entry into international society began with the first Serbian Uprising of 1804. During the remainder of the 19 th century Serbia slowly but steadily gained entry into the European society of states, obtaining full sovereign rights at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. In this article I intend to shed light on how Serbia's collective memories affected its foreign policy behavior during this process. In so doing I will take cues from the English School's concern with the expansion of international society. The conventional English School scholarship conceptualized the expansion of international society as a unidirectional diffusion of sovereignty from the center outwards (Bull and Watson 1984) . More recently, this perspective has been challenged on various grounds including its disregard of the entrant's agency. Consequently, the attention has been
drawn to study what the entrants, especially the late-arrivals, made of the process (Suzuki 2009 , Neumann 2011 , Zarakol 2011 . In particular, Iver Neumann argued that the entrant's stance vis-à-vis the international society which it was aiming to join could be explained in terms of memory of the system it was leaving behind (Neumann 2011) . He explained Russia's long, difficult and incomplete entry into sovereign society of states in terms of its experiences of being part of the Mongol Empire between the 13 th and 15 th century.
In this paper I will investigate how memories of being part of previous suzerain systems influenced Serbia's encounter with the sovereign society of European states. I will demonstrate that early nation-builders in the 19 th century were heavily drawing on the medieval memories of suzerainty. I concur with Neumann that this memory came "with an understanding of politics as being about constituting the center of the system" (Neumann 2011: 464) . Same as in case of Russia, the medieval memories significantly informed and complicated Serbia's subsequent entry into the European society of states.
However, in this article I submit that the key memories that Serbia's nation builders drew upon were not related to the suzerain system from which they were immediately breaking away, which was the Ottoman Empire. The collective memories that newborn Serbia of the early 19 th century evoked in order to make sense of the world stretched much deeper into the past. These memories pertained to a medieval Serbian state that existed for centuries, belonging both culturally and politically to the Byzantine system of states, experienced its Golden Age in the 14 th century and then came to an abrupt end. Those memories were productive in that they allowed Serbia's early nation-builders to imagine community not only in space but also in time, trans-historically as it were.
However, the historical memories of the medieval Serbian polity -petrified in the Janus faced image of the mighty Empire of Stefan Dušan and its collapse after the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 -complicated Serbia's socialisation within the European society of states ever after. With this memory came an understanding of politics as positioning oneself at the center of an imperial order. At the beginning of the 19 th century this idea was badly out of sync with Serbia's poor military, diplomatic or economic capabilities. As the century drew to a close and Serbia grew stronger, the idea of translatio imperii was increasingly becoming anachronistic in the emerging age of self-determination.
Consequently, during the second half of the 19 th century the outdated and unwieldy idea of the Serbian Empire was gradually replaced with the idea of Yugoslavia, with Serbia at its core. The understanding of politics continued to shape Serbia's relations in the Balkans and beyond. Seven decades after it was established, the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia coincided with Serbia's reactivation of key medieval memories in the late 1980s. To this very day, medieval memories complicate Serbia's coming to terms with the post-Yugoslav geopolitical order, suspending it within the outer ring of European society of states.
The paper proceeds in the following order: first, I shortly present the extant literature on the expansion of international society within the English School of International
Relations and recent critiques thereof. In the second section, I discuss the role that collective memories play in the entrant's foreign policy behaviour. Then, thirdly, I lay out the contours of Serbia's medieval history within the Byzantine system of states. The fourth section discusses the influence of historic memories of the medieval "past trauma"
and "chosen glory" on Serbia's complicated stance towards the European society of states. The final section expands the analysis to the Yugoslav period and beyond, suggesting that the long shadow of Byzantium still haunts Serbia's struggle for recognition and position in the international society.
The English School between Expansion and Entry into International Society
The English School is a collection of theoretical and empirical works in the field of International Relations (IR) that has been developed since the late 1950s. The School combined power-political insights of Realism with the idea that the international domain is also shaped by social forces, which was later espoused by social constructivists (Buzan 2004 ). The English School revolves around three key concepts -the international system, the international society and the world society. Each of these concepts is affiliated with three major scholars: Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant, and they have been codified by Martin Wight as the "three traditions" of IR -Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism, respectively (Wight 1991 , Buzan 2004 . The international system is composed of two or more interacting states. According to Martin Wight there are only two types of state systems: sovereign and suzerain. The sovereign system is composed of states which recognize no superior authority among them. In opposition to this, a suzerain state system represents "a group of states having relations more or less permanent with one another, but one among them asserts unique claims which the others formally or tacitly accept" (Wight 1977: 23) . Sovereign systems may also have a dominant power at any one time but, in contrast to suzerain systems, "hegemony passes from one power to another and is constantly subject to dispute" (Bull 1977: 11) . Moreover, while the sovereign system is maintained through the balance of power, the suzerain is reproduced through the 'divide and rule' principle (lat. divide et impera).
In contrast to the system of states, the society of states is bound by a set of common rules, values and institutions (Bull 1977 , Dunne 1998 . It is defined as:
a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities)
which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements (Bull and Watson 1984: 1) (Bull 1977: 26-31 Western Europe (Zhang 1991 , Stivachtis 1998 , Sharp 2003 , Suzuki 2005 ,Suzuki 2009 , Neumann 2008 , 2011 , Zarakol 2011 . These studies revealed three insights of critical importance.
First, they showed that the question of entry is not a question of 'yes or no' but rather the question of degree (Neumann 2011: 466 (Keene 2002 , Keal 2003 , Suzuki 2005 , Suzuki 2009 ). On the inside, the society of sovereign states tended to provide equality of rights and peaceful coexistence, while on the outside its goal was to civilize the backward non-Europeans (Keene 2002: 167) .
Drawing on Keene's poignant critique, Shogo Suzuki investigated "how this particular aspect of European International Society affected non-European states' socialization".
His empirical case study of Japan proved that Japan's socialization into this "Janus faced" European international society did not have straightforward effects on the Japanese foreign policy, as the orthodox English School theorists would expect. In fact, it 2 Its entry started with the Treaty of Karlowitz signed in 1699. Since it came after a series of devastating defeats suffered in the course of fourteen years of wars fought between the Ottoman Empire and the Holy League (Austria, Venice, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), it was the first treaty in which the Ottomans agreed to negotiate the terms with European powers and to accept mediation (Britain and Netherlands). Article 7 of the Treaty of Paris from 1856 stipulates that the protection of independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire is in the general interest of European powers (Gourdon 1857 , Neumann 1999 led to the adoption of two distinct foreign policies. In relation to other full-fledged members of the international society Japan did indeed adopt principles of sovereignty and mutual respect, adhering to international law and engaging in diplomatic relations European style. In relation to those "uncivilized states" from its Asian backyard that were on the outside of the club, however, Japan acted in an aggressive and imperialist manner (Suzuki 2005: 139) . In order to prove their "in-ness" the newcomers such as Japan securitized and colonized the "uncivilized" space outside the club of sovereign states.
Suzuki thus demonstrated that the historic record of the expansion of the International Society had ambivalent effects on the world order, to say the least.
The third and -at least for this article -the most important point made by the new generation of English School theorists is that entrants do not simply seek to conform to the standards of behavior prescribed by international society, be they tolerance or aggression. These studies argued that entrants also draw on their past experiences and memories. Ayse Zarakol, for example, pointed out that the stigma of outsiders as well as past defeats and humiliations caused new entrants to be extra-sensitive about their status and recognition (Zarakol 2011) . Iver Neumann focused on the role that entrants' memories of the past system to which they used to belong played in their entry into the sovereign systems they aspired to join. Given that "there has only been one sovereign system around for the last two long millennia", Neumann concludes that "it follows that any new member entering European international society, which is conceptualized as sovereign, must have its background in a suzerain system" (Neumann 2011: 470) . It is therefore by default that entrants draw on memories of the suzerain system from which they had broken free. India, but also to those like Egypt and Serbia" (ibid: 464).
Collective Memory, Time Collapse and Synchronization
In this paper I confirm that Neumann's assumption also applies to the case of Serbia, and that the focus on collective memories helps us to better understand the complex relations that this state has had with the European society of states over the past two centuries or so. In other words, I fully concur with the argument that memories stemming from the past suzerain system influence the entrant's foreign policy stance. Nonetheless I expand this theoretical argument further by making two additional claims.
First, I argue that the memories do not have to come necessarily from the suzerain system from which the polity is immediately breaking away. As we will see in the next section, Serbia's nation-builders of the early 19 th century, although most probably relying heavily on their immediate collective experience of being part of the Ottoman Empire at the level of practical consciousness, drew much more profoundly on the memories of the 14 th century at the level of discursive consciousness (Giddens 1984: 49) . Therefore, I submit that the question of which memories will prevail at which given moment of time does not have necessarily to do with the memories' continuity or recentness but rather with their usefulness in making sense of the present situation. Further examination of this assertion would require a conceptual discussion of collective memory and time collapse.
Maurice Halbwhachs provided an exceptional distinction between autobiographical, collective and historic memories. Autobiographical memory is based on personal experience that rests embedded within a certain social framework. Collective memory is based on mediated experience of the group that has a bearing on that group's identity.
Finally, historical memory is systematically remembered past which is no longer important for the life of the group. As Halbwachs put it: "History indeed resembles a crowded cemetery, where room must constantly be made for new tombstones" (Halbwachs 1980: 52) . My interest here lies with collective memories, those that sustain collective identity, endow polities with cognitive control of their environments and enable them to 'go on' with their everyday practices (Giddens 1991:38) . The question is, however, not whether autobiographical or historical memories can be turned into collective memories but rather who does it, why and to what effect.
In order to provide a theoretical answer to these questions, I will rely on the work of psychiatrist Vamik Volkan. According to Volkan, collective identity resembles a large canvas tent that is emotionally binding individuals into a group. The canvas is held erect by the tent pole that represents the political elite at any given moment. In times of shared stress and anxiety, "the members become preoccupied with repairing and mending the tears in the canvas of the large-group tent. In fact, the main reason for rallying around the pole is to protect the large-group identity" (Volkan 1997: 28) . Political leaders resort to a mnemonic technique called "time collapse" in which collective emotions about a shared past trauma or chosen glory fuse with those pertaining to the present situation. Chosen traumas, according to Volkan, influence collective identity much more pervasively then chosen glories, because they "bring with them powerful experiences of loss and feelings of humiliation, vengeance and hatred that trigger a variety of unconscious defense mechanisms that attempt to reverse these experiences and feelings" (Volkan 1997: 82) .
Entry into international society usually progresses through wars or great upheavals. In times of such immense collective stress, a window of opportunity arises for political elites to create time collapse, reactivate dormant past glories and/or chosen traumas from historical memories and turn them into what Halbwachs calls collective memory. This is how transhistorical memories are turned into powerful templates for action.
The second theoretical argument that I make in this paper is that once they are reactivated, collective memories are not preserved in their original form. Instead, they are continuously synchronized, more or less successfully, with the needs of the present situation. Having said that, the entry can be reconceptualized as the process of international socialization during which entrants continuously learn how to translate their past memories into the language of the new society of states they are aspiring to join. In the beginning, an entrant seems like an aphasiac or a foreigner described by Halbwachs:
"He tries to be understood by others and to understand them -like a man in a foreign country who does not speak the language but knows the history of this country and has not forgotten his own history. But he lacks a large number of current notions" (Halbwachs 1992: 43) . From the previous worlds the entrants bring a set of memories which are productive on the inside in the sense of their ontological security, but which may as well be -and often are -quite dysfunctional on the outside in terms of their physical security and wellbeing (Mitzen 2006) . In time, however, entrants attempt to gradually embed their recollections into the new international social framework of memory. The next section turns to the case of Serbia, in which I demonstrate that the process of memory synchronization can take a very long time. with the help of Byzantium and its Emperor Constantine VII (Ćorović 2005: 126) . 4 By the 11 th century the Serbian polity was strongly tied to the Byzantine Empire through military conflicts, but also through culture, marriage and investiture (Ferjančić 2009 : 80,Pavlović 2004 .
Medieval Serbia and the Byzantine System of States
The Byzantine Empire was a standard example of the suzerain system of states. As both the secular head of the Empire and the head of the Orthodox Church, the Byzantine Emperor -the Basileus -was the 'overlord of the universe'. "All other Christian princes", as Martin Wight observes, "were his representatives, and all lands that had formerly belonged to the Empire but were now lost would in due time return to their lawful sovereign" (Wight 1977: 23) . The Byzantine Empire considered the rest of the civilized world the oikoumene, of tributary status (Wight 1977 : 199, Watson 1992 The collective memory of the past glory stemmed from the two main sources of the time:
the folk songs and the 18 th century "monastic historicism", both cherishing Stefan Dušan's Empire and lamenting over the defeat in the Kosovo battle (Bataković 1994 ).
The idea gained resonance among the Serbs living in the Habsburg Empire, particularly in times of peasant rebellions and upheavals (Ljušić 2004: 57) . One of the exemplary initiatives came from the pen of Jovan Jovanović, the Bishop of Bačka, who proposed the creation of Serbo-Bulgarian Empire led by Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich Romanoff of Russia (Perović 1978, 113-116) . Finally, between 1792 and 1807, prominent Serbian religious and political figures from Montenegro also developed a number of ideas on how to restore the medieval Serb Empire and submitted them on several occasions to the Russian Empire (Ljušić 2004 : 58, Bataković 2004 . In effect, 350 years after the disappearance of its medieval state, the contours of the Serbian political community were re-imagined into existence through the invocation of dormant medieval memories of past glories and chosen traumas.
Serbia was, naturally, far too weak to realize its imperial idea without the approval of any of the other great powers. In 1812, Russian and Ottoman Empires signed the Treaty of Bucharest that granted Serbia a semi-autonomous status, while Russia was proclaimed as its guarantor. In spite of the fact that Serbian rebels rejected the treaty, it represented the formal beginning of Serbia's entry into international society. Nonetheless, the lack of capabilities or international support for the idea of Serbian Empire did not prevent this collective memory from determining Serbia's foreign policy behavior in the decades to come. According to secret plans of Prince Miloš Obrenović (1815-1839), the Serbian Empire was meant to include "Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Herzegovina, Uskokija (Krajina), Banat, the Slovenes, Illyria (perhaps Croatia), Dalmatia, Montenegro and the Albanian mountains" (Bataković 1994) . Such an aspiration was shared by all the leaders of the Second Serbian Uprising (1815-1830) and "went without saying". The Second
Uprising ended with the Hatt-i-Sharif from the 1830 which defined Serbia as an autonomous vassal principality within the Ottoman Empire.
The achievement of autonomy and prolonged socialization in the European politics did not weaken the influence of medieval memories on the nation-building project. To the contrary, throughout the entire 19 th century, the Serbian nation-building project continued to rest on the idea that the Serbian medieval Empire simply put its existence on pause in 1389 to resume it five centuries later and continue its business as usual. This served well to legitimize the nation-building project both within and without Serbia. However, such a construction of identity carried with it particular memories that medieval Serbia had accumulated during its existence within the Byzantine suzerain system of states. These were the memories of politics being an art of positioning oneself at the center of the regional order.
An excellent illustration of this can be found in Načertanije (1844), the first document to define national interests of modern Serbia. Kept secret for half a century, Načertanije was practically the official national strategy until 1867, when Garašanin was dismissed.
Unofficially, however, it served as the foundation for the Serbian foreign policy until the creation of the first Yugoslavia in 1918 (Lopandić 2010a ).
Načertanije could not be more explicit about the role that medieval memories played in Serbia's foreign policy:
The Serbian state must strive to expand and become stronger; its roots and foundation are firmly embedded in the Serbian Empire of the 13th and 14th centuries and the glorious pageant of Serbian history. Historically speaking, the Serbian rulers, it may be remembered, began to assume the position held by the Greek Empire and almost succeeded in making an end of it, replacing the collapsed Eastern Roman Empire with a Serbian-Slavic one. Emperor Dusan the Mighty had even adopted the crest of the Greek Empire. The arrival of the Turks in the Balkans interrupted this change, and prevented it from taking place for a long time. But now, since the Turkish power is broken and destroyed, so to speak, this process must commence once more in the same spirit and again be undertaken in the knowledge of that right (Hehn 1975 and North Albania. These two states would be independent in everything but foreign affairs which would remain under the suzerainty of the Sultan (Lopandić 2010b: 65, 71 ).
The plan was rejected, but the idea of creating either great Serbia or a Serbian led SouthSlav Empire remained. Crazy Serbs thought that once they manage to do away with the Croatian national idea with the help of archenemies of Slavism, the idea that provided them with safety throughout the centuries, and once they destroyed the good Bulgarian people, they will have a ready-made Dušan's Empire. Now I wish to God that they would realize that the grave they are digging for others is the same one that they are preparing for themselves. This entire idea of resurrecting Dušan's Empire is crazy and delusional… Today, it is an anachronism and a fraud (Ljušić 2004: 29) .
Although Serbia's idea to resurrect Dušan's medieval empire from the ashes of the Ottoman and Byzantine Empires was definitely defeated, the idea of positioning itself at the center of the regional order was not. As the century was drawing to a close, the imperial memories were synchronized with the social and material structure of the European society of states. Socially, the medieval memory was being synchronized with the emerging Romanticist framework of self-determination and linguistically defined nation states. Materially, the medieval memory was synchronizing with the weak position of Serbia in the balance of European powers. The result was Yugoslavia. However, the first organized cultural and political movement to propagate South Slav unity was the Illyrian movement that was active in Croatia between the 1830s and the 1850s. Although Serbia advocated for the unification of South Slavs into a single Serbian Empire in the 1840s, it openly rejected the Illyrian movement. The main reason for this is the fact that Serbia had by then gained a certain level of self-confidence and was not ready to leave the leadership of the South Slav unification to Zagreb, which was viewed as being under the strong influence of Austria and Catholicism (Ekmečić 1989 : 464, Pišev 2009 . 12 For the same reasons, Načertanije did not envisage the creation of Yugoslavia with Croatia, or close cooperation with it for that matter (Ibid: 480).
From Dušan's Empire to the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia
When the revolution swept across Europe and shook the foundations of the Habsburg Empire in 1848, Serbia got involved in it through agitation and military support of the Serb struggle against the Hungarians who, on their part, revolted against Vienna. This inspired Ilija Garašanin , for the first time seriously, to give some thought to the creation of a joint Yugoslav state together with the Croats. In a letter written in the heat of the revolutionary summer, Garašanin wrote: "Although Serbia will not find perfect security for its nationality in its unification with the Slavs, it will have to embrace this idea should it prove to be the only option" (Simeunović 2000: 29) . During the following two decades or so, this idea was present on the agenda parallel to the one of resurrecting the Serbian Empire, and was even confused with it, particularly during the second reign of Prince Mihajlo Obrenović (1860-1868). After his assassination Serbia adopted Habsburgfriendly foreign policy and focused on a narrower goal of gaining independence from the Ottomans.
The 1903 At this place, at this place in the heart of Serbia at the Field of Kosovo, six centuries ago, a full 600 years ago, one of the greatest battles of all times was fought. As with all the major events, there are many questions and secrets attached to it and they remain the subject of public curiosity and scientific research. By the force of social circumstances, this great 600 th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo is occurring in the year when Serbia, after many years and many decades, has regained its state, national, and spiritual integrity. It is not, therefore, difficult for us today to answer that age-old question: How are we going to face Miloš, Miloš Obilić, the legendary hero of the Battle of Kosovo?
The speech was a prime example of time collapse, emotionally fusing medieval memories with key political challenges of the day. As Serbian nationalism reared its ugly head, it was feeding similar projects across a country that will soon break apart through a series of armed conflicts in the 1990s. The reactivation of medieval memories came with the urge to position oneself yet again at the center of the polity, thus extending a fatal blow to the already fragile structures of the country. The Gazimestan speech was the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia. (White 2000: 190) .
Conclusion
The medieval memory of the Serbian empire destroyed in the 14 th century was the key When the Yugoslav polity weakened in the 1980s, medieval memories were invoked once again, first by Serbia's intellectuals and then by its establishment, in order to stabilize the "ethnic tent" and restore ontological security it provided. To be sure, medieval and ancient memories were evoked by nationalist elites across Yugoslavia.
Although the intention of this paper was only to analyse only Serbian memories, it would be interesting for some future research to see how those memories shaped the policies of other Yugoslav nations. Throughout the 1990s, due to its involvement in violent conflicts, Serbia was ostracized from the international society and treated as a pariah state. However, once the war ended and Milošević was ousted from power, Serbia began its process of democratization and return into international society (Kostoviceva 2004 ).
However, one of its biggest stumbling blocks remains the issue of Kosovo, which Serbia still regards as the medieval cradle of its statehood and the Serbian Jerusalem. It remains to be seen to what extent and how quickly Serbia will manage to synchronize its fading but resilient medieval memories with the new social framework defined by the EU and NATO enlargement and the imperatives of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans.
In sum, this article aimed to demonstrate that both rise and fall of Yugoslavia, as well as Serbia's recent challenges, attest that collective memories can last longer and have a
deeper influence on what actors think, say and do in foreign policy then the conventional IR scholarship has so far been willing to admit.
